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examine prices within product categories to determine if China's varieties command a premium
relative to its level of development.
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1. Introduction
Speculation about the impact Chinese exports will have on developed
and developing countries over the coming decade varies widely. Some
observers predict the imminent end of manufacturing in economies like the
United States, while others believe low- and middle-income countries to
be most at risk. This paper employs product-level U.S. import data to
compare China’s exports to the United States to those of other developed
and developing economies. I ﬁnd China’s export bundle to be both more
and less “sophisticated” than its peers. While it exports more products
in common with OECD countries than would be expected given its level
of development, the prices it receives for its exports compared with its per
capita GDP have been declining with time.
This paper’s assessment of Chinese exports is guided by the factor pro-
portions framework. Endowment-based comparative advantage implies
that extremely labor-abundant China should compete only indirectly with
relatively more capital- and skill-abundant countries in world markets. Un-
der this framework, China’s export bundle should more closely resemble
that of Vietnam than Germany or Japan. China’s extraordinary product
penetration is at odds with this implication, while the relatively low prices
it receives within product markets is consistent with it.
Lacking information on export product attributes, I gauge export “so-
phistication” along two observable dimensions of the data. First, I com-
pare the range of product categories China exports to the United States
to the export bundles of other U.S. trading partners under the assumption
that similarly developed economies export a comparable range of products
(Finger and Kreinin 1979). Second, I compare Chinese export unit values
within these product categories to the prices received by other U.S. trading
partners. The latter comparison relies unit values being a reliable signal
of endowment-driven vertical diﬀerentiation.1
China’s export overlap with the OECD has increased dramatically over
time, jumping from a rank of 21 among non-OECD U.S. trading partners
1Such comparisons ignore the fact that product prices might also diﬀer due to compar-
ative advantage, i.e., relatively low production costs due to factor abundance or greater
eﬃciency (Hallak and Schott 2005). Schott (2004) demonstrates that within-product
variation in export unit values is positively associated with exporter skill and capital
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in 1972 to a rank of 3 in 2001, just behind Mexico and Taiwan. This
growth is due to a very large increase in China’s export product penetra-
tion, i.e., the share of all product categories with positive exports. By
2001 China’s export penetration exceeded that of all of Latin America
and the Caribbean combined. Within Latin America, only Mexico and
Brazil achieve comparable levels of OECD export similarity and penetra-
tion. From the standpoint of product penetration, China’s export mix is
ahead of its peers.
Chinese export prices within product categories do not follow a similar
trend. In the 1970s and 1980s, when China was present in relatively few
product categories, its exports on average sold at a premium relative to
its per capita GDP (but at a discount relative to its skill abundance). In
the 1990s, however, this trend reversed as Chinese exports began selling
at a discount with respect to its per capita GDP and its discount with
respect to its skill abundance increased. I also show that Chinese exports
sell for a substantial discount relative to OECD varieties over the entire
sample period, and that this gap appears to be increasing in Chemicals
and Machinery. Further research into the extent to which these trends
are driven by quality upgrading on the part of developed economies is
warranted.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief overview of the theory guiding the analysis; Section 3 summarizes
China’s relative endowments; and Section 4 estimates the relative sophis-
tication of Chinese exports. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory
The analysis in this paper is guided by the factor proportions frame-
work, in particular the multiple cone equilibrium of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, which has country product mix varying with relative factor endow-
ments.2 A two-factor version of this equilibrium is displayed in the Lerner
diagram in the left panel of Figure 1. This diagram features four industries
— apparel, textiles, machinery and chemicals — which diﬀer in terms of their
capital intensity. Apparel is the most labor-intensive industry while chem-
2Leamer (1984, 1987) and Schott (2003, 2004) oﬀer evidence in support of the idea
that country product mix is a function of their relative endowments.The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 4
icals is the most capital intensive. Under standard assumptions (see Dixit
and Norman 1980), the four industries’ unit-value isoquants delineate three
cones of diversiﬁcation, where cone refers to the set of relative endowment
vectors selecting a unique mix of, in this case, two industries.
Because production of an industry outside of the cone in which a country
resides results in negative proﬁt, GDP-maximizing countries specialize in
the two industries anchoring their cones, i.e. the two industries whose input
intensities are most closely related to their endowments.3 The negative
proﬁts that capital-abundant United States would earn in labor-intensive
apparel and textiles, for example, can be seen by comparing the amount of
capital and labor that can be bought for one dollar in the United States
(via the downward sloping isocost curve deﬁned by rUS and wUS)w i t ht h e
amount of capital and labor needed to produce one dollar’s worth of output
(via the unit value isoquants). A key message of Figure 1 is that relatively
high production costs drive countries out of industries at odds with their
comparative advantage.
In the equilibrium depicted in the left panel of Figure 1, the United
States, Latin America and China specialize in distinct bundles of indus-
tries, with the United States and China having no industries in common.
If we assume the economies of Latin America occupy the middle cone of
diversiﬁcation, the labor-intensive portion of their product mix overlaps
with that of labor-abundant China while the capital-intensive portion of
its product mix overlaps with that of capital-abundant United States.4 As
indicated in the ﬁgure, the overlap of countries’ product mix is a function
of the relative similarity of their endowments.5
Substantial intra-national factor disparities within China, however, may
mean that China’s exports overlap with those of countries in the capital-
intensive cone. Courant and Deardorﬀ (1992) show theoretically that the
uneven, or “lumpy” internal distribution of factors within China depicted
in the right-hand panel of the ﬁgure can induce labor-abundant China to
3Leamer (1987) provides generalizations of these implications for higher dimensional
settings.
4In a more general, three-factor setting, these overlaps might be less extreme given
Latin American land abundance. For a more detailed discussion of the potential eﬀects
of Latin American resource abundance on development, see Leamer et al. (1999).
5Under this scenario, Latin America is in the “middle” and faces direct competition
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export relatively capital-intensive goods. Such an equilibrium is presented
in the right panel of Figure 1, which distributes China’s regions across the
middle and labor-intensive cones of diversiﬁcation to reﬂect their underly-
ing heterogeneity. Shanghai, for example, is far more skill- and capital-
abundant than the labor-abundant inland province of Guizhou, and there-
fore may produce exactly the same mix of goods as the “middle” countries
of Latin America. In China’s case, factor lumpiness is supported by the ex-
plicit control of factor movements exercised by the government, which, for
example, dampens the movement of labor from the interior to the coasts.
These restrictions may prevent the factor-price disparities illustrated in
the ﬁgure (via isocost lines) from being arbitraged away inside the country,
thereby reinforcing the concomitant tendency of regions to produce and ex-
port goods of diﬀerent capital intensity. Regional diversity within China
may help explain the extraordinary product penetration trends noted be-
low.6
In this paper I make use of product-level trade data to determine the rel-
ative sophistication of China’s manufacturing exports. Product-level data
provide much sharper resolution of this sophistication than industry-level
data for two reasons. First, while virtually all countries of the world ex-
port all industries (e.g., “electronics”), they exhibit substantial heterogene-
ity across products within industries. Second, product-level data permit
examination of trading partner heterogeneity within product markets via
unit values. Use of product-level data for these purposes requires a version
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (and Figure 1) that is based on production
that is more disaggregate than industries.7 Intuition for such a model can
be found by replacing the industry identiﬁers on the isoquants in Figure 1
with product identiﬁers. Within a particular industry like Electronics, for
example, labor-abundant countries might export portable black and white
televisions, more capital-abundant countries might export color televisions,
and the most capital-abundant countries might export plasma displays.
6Another contributing factor may be China’s size. Hummels and Klenow (2005) ﬁnd
that large countries export a signiﬁcantly higher number of products than small countries.
7Schott (2004) provides evidence that countries specialize within products according
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3. China’s Relative Endowments
This section compares Chinese skill, capital and land abundance to that
of other U.S. trading partners. It also examines indirect evidence on the
distribution of endowments across regions within China. These compar-
isons convey two messages. First, they show that in aggregate, China is
extremely skill-, capital- and land- scarce. All else equal, this scarcity
implies that China should specialize in only the most labor-intensive, i.e.,
least “sophisticated”, exports. The second message is that regions within
China exhibit substantial variation in relative development.
In comparing China to other groups of countries, I make use of the
country-region assignments provided in Table 5.8 Four aspects of how
countries are assigned to regions deserve mention. First, Latin America
includes all of the countries of Central and South America, plus Mexico.
Second, Japan is assigned to the OECD rather than Asia. Third, I deﬁne
the OECD as the 23 members in place as of 1974 in order to exclude Korea,
Mexico and other, more recent entrants. The resulting set of countries
captures a more uniform mix of high-wage, developed economies.9 Finally,
the actual set of countries within each region used in computing any given
summary statistic may vary depending upon data availability.
Tables 1 and 2 provide complementary views of China’s labor abundance
relative to other countries in Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and the
OECD. Table 1 compares China’s relative endowments to the mean relative
endowments of other countries, by region. The ﬁrst four columns of the
table report Barro and Lee (2000) education attainments. These columns
reveal that highly skilled workers — those with more than a secondary school
education — are relatively scarce in Asia compared to Latin America, and
scarcer still in China. While 13 percent of Latin America’s population had
attained a post-secondary education by 1999, the numbers are 8 percent and
3 percent for Asia and China, respectively. China also has a higher share
of workers without any schooling than Latin America or the Caribbean: 21
percent of its population, versus 18 percent for both the Caribbean and
Latin America, have never received formal schooling.
Table 2 reports the location of China in the distribution of other region’s
8These assignments are based on United Nations country codes, except as noted below.
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relative endowments. A value of 50 in this table, for example, indicates
that China’s relative endowments are equal to the median of the noted
region. China’s skill scarcity ranks the country below the median of the
Asian, Latin American and Caribbean distributions. As indicated in Table
2, China’s post-secondary education attainment places it in the 32nd per-
centile in Asia (behind Pakistan and India), in the 5th percentile of Latin
America (just behind Guyana) and in the 33rd percentile of the Caribbean
(between Haiti and Jamaica). It has relatively more unschooled citizens
than 58 percent of Asian countries, 68 percent of Latin American countries
and 67 percent of Caribbean countries.
In addition to being relatively skill scarce, China is relatively capital
and land scarce. As of 2000, it has 0.10 hectares of arable land per person
versus 0.25 hectares per person in Latin America, placing it in the 19th
percentile of the Latin American distribution (between El Salvador and
Venezuela). It’s median (Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993) capital per capita
in 1990 (the latest year available) of $2,274 is also relatively low, placing it
at the 21st percentile of the Latin American distribution (between Ecuador
and Honduras).10
Comparable data on the distribution of factors within China is un-
available. In its place, Table 3 compares Chinese provinces, Autonomous
Regions and Municipalities along two dimensions in 1999 using data on
(non-PPP-adjusted) per capita GDP (PCGDP) and illiteracy from the Chi-
nese government quoted in OECD (2001). Regions in the table are sorted
according to PCGDP, which ranges from $3,275 (CNY 30,805) in Shang-
hai to $299 (CNY 2475) in the inland province of Guizhou. To put this
variation in perspective, note that comparable World Bank PCGDP ﬁgures
for Korea, Mexico and Brazil are $10,855, $5,934 and $3,538, respectively,
and that China’s aggregate PCGDP is $856. The ﬁnal column of Table 3
reports Chinese regional illiteracy rates.11 These range from a high of 66
percent in Tibet to a low of 4 in Chonqing Municipality. By comparison,
World Bank illiteracy rates in the over-15-year-old population in Mexico,
Brazil and China as a whole are 9, 14 and 14 percent, respectively.
10I compare regions’ capital per capita in Tables 1 and 2 using the median rather
than the mean because of signiﬁcant outliers (for Mexico and Uruguay among others) in
the Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) dataset. More recent cross-national comparisons of
capital abundance that include China as an observation are unavailable.
11Intra-national PCGDP and illiteracy in China have a correlation of -0.33.The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 8
Though these comparisons are by no means rigorous, they do suggest
that some regions of China may be able to produce products with skill and
capital intensity approaching that of countries with much greater skill and
capital abundance than exhibited by China in aggregate. These trends
provide some intuition for China’s relatively high export overlap with the
OECD.
4. The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports
This section examines product-level trade data to assess the relative
sophistication of China’s manufacturing exports. This analysis exploits
product-level U.S. import data available from the U.S. Census Bureau and
compiled by Feenstra et al. (2002). These data record the customs value
of all U.S. imports by exporting country from 1972 to 2001 according to
thousands of ﬁnely detailed categories, which I refer to as ‘products’ or
‘goods’.12 I refer to imports at higher levels of aggregation, such as the
one-digit Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation, Revision 3 (SITC1)
system, as ‘industries’. I refer to imports within product categories as
country ‘varieties’.
Table 4 lists the ten mutually exclusive SITC1 industries and reports the
number of product categories in each industry in both 1972 and 2001. In-
dustries 0 through 4 comprise resource products, while industries 5 through
8 encompass manufacturing goods, which are the focus of this study. Two
of the manufacturing industries, Manufactured Materials (SITC1=6) and
Miscellaneous Manufactures (SITC1=8) — which include textiles and ap-
parel, respectively — account for the largest share of products in both peri-
ods. Machinery (SITC1=7), on the other hand, experiences the largest in-
crease in the number of product categories over the sample period. Because
of their idiosyncrasy, I exclude products from industry 9 (Not Elsewhere
Classiﬁed) from the analysis.
My comparison of Chinese and other countries’ trade patterns proceeds
under the assumption that U.S. trading partners’ exports to the U.S. ac-
curately reﬂects their domestic production as well as their exports to other
12Imports are classiﬁed according to seven-digit Tariﬀ Schedule of the United States
(TSUSA) codes from 1972 through 1988 and according to the ten-digit Harmonized
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markets. This assumption is partially justiﬁed by the relative openness
of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as an export destination. Nev-
ertheless, the existence of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers (e.g., the Multiﬁber
Arrangement), as well as more general trade costs such as transportation,
can be inﬂuential in determining which of a country’s goods are exported,
and to which trading partner they are sent (see, for example, Deardorﬀ
2004). Unfortunately, comparable product-level trade data for other des-
tination countries, such as European Union, is unavailable.
4.1. China’s Export Bundle
This section assesses the relative sophistication of China’s manufactur-
ing export bundle in terms of its similarity to that of the aggregate OECD
and other developing countries. Three ﬁndings stand out. First, China’s
export similarity with the OECD increases substantially over the sample
period, far more than any other U.S. trading partner. Second, China’s
export similarity vis a vis the OECD generally exceeds that of countries
with similar relative endowments. Third, China’s “excess” similarity with
the OECD increases over time. Before computing U.S. trading partners’
export similarity, I brieﬂy summarize countries’ U.S. market share and
product penetration. China’s growth in these two components of export
similarity between 1972 and 2001 has been exceptional.
Table 6 reports the U.S. manufacturing import value market share of
Asia, Latin America, the OECD and China, by industry, for the ﬁrst and










where c indexes countries and c ∈ r captures the set of countries in region
r. Note that results for Asia exclude China and that market shares across
the columns of Table 6 do not sum to 100 percent because all U.S. trading
partners are not represented.
The market share trends in Table 6 convey several messages. First,
they show that exports from developed economies, proxied here by the
13As noted above, Table 5 provides a mapping of countries to regions.The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 10
OECD, dominate the U.S. market, though less so over time. While the
OECD accounted for 83 percent of manufacturing imports in 1972, this
share falls to 52 percent by 2001. Second, they reveal that China is the
main contributor to Asia’s overall growth. China’s share of manufacturing
imports increases steadily from just above 0 percent in 1972 to 11 percent
in 2001, driven by a very large gain in Miscellaneous Manufacturing. Over
the same interval, the remaining countries in Asia saw their market share
increase from 11 percent to 18 percent.
China’s 11 percentage point jump in market share dominates all other
U.S. trading partners except for Mexico. Table 7 reports the countries
with the top ten absolute (left panel) and percent growth (right panel)
changes in manufacturing market share between 1972 and 2001.14 China
tops both lists, with only Mexico coming close in terms of absolute gains.
Two other countries — Ireland and Indonesia — experience absolute and per-
cent growth changes large enough to be included in both panels. For most
countries, gains in market share are due to growth in Machinery or Mis-
cellaneous Manufactures exports. Ireland’s growth, driven by Chemicals
(which includes pharmaceuticals), is an exception.
Manufacturing product penetration by region and industry is summa-
rized in Table 8. Each cell in the Table 8 reports the percent of products
in an industry exported by China or the group of countries in the noted
region. Regional penetration is 100 percent if at least one country in the
region exports each good to the United States and zero if no country ex-
ports any of the industry’s products to the United States.15 As above,
results for Asia exclude China.
Table 8 reports several interesting trends. First, it reveals that product
penetration by the OECD is virtually 100 percent throughout the sample
period. Second, it shows that product penetration by Asian and Latin
American countries, though substantially lower than the OECD in 1972,
has increased markedly over time.16 Finally, Table 8 reveals that China,
14Countries with a market share of zero in 1972 are ineligible for ranking on percent
change panel of the ﬁgure.
15The total number of products in each industry in 1972 and 2001 is reported in the
ﬁnal two columns of Table 4.
16These two trends are puzzling from the standpoint of the factor proportions frame-
work because they imply declining across-product specialization among OECD and non-
OECD countries over time. Schott (2004) provides a partial resolution to this puzzleThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 11
in particular, has experienced a very large increase in product penetration,
from 9 percent in 1972 to 70 percent in 2001. Table 9, which ranks countries
with the biggest absolute gains in penetration between 1972 and 2001,
shows that China’s 61 percentage point increase is the largest of any trading
partner by a factor of two.
I measure countries’ or regions’ export bundle overlap via Finger and
Kreinin’s (1979) export similarity index (ESI), which incorporates infor-
mation about both market share and product penetration. For any two
U.S. trading partners c and d in year t, Finger and Kreinin deﬁne their









where stpc is the share of country c’s exports in manufacturing product
p in year t. This bilateral measure is computed using all manufacturing
products and is bounded by zero and unity: ESItcd =0if countries c and
d have no products in common in year t and ESItcd =1if their exports
are distributed identically across products. To compare two regions (or
to compare a region with a country), I sum exports over countries in the
region and then use region-level rather than country-level export shares in
equation 2.
Figure 2 displays a box-and-whisker plot of non-OECD U.S. trading
partners’ ESI with the OECD at ten-year intervals from 1972 to 2001.
Each year’s box spans the inter-quartile range of the data, while lines within
the boxes record the median observation in each year. The key message of
the ﬁgure, consistent with the information presented in the last section, is
that non-OECD countries’ overlap with the OECD is generally increasing
with time.
Table 10 reports China’s export similarity with Asia (which excludes
China), Latin America and the OECD at ten-year intervals from 1972 to
2001. China’s overlap is greatest vis a vis aggregate Asia and lowest with
the aggregate OECD. In percentage terms, overlap has grown most with
the OECD, from 0.09 in 1972 to 0.75 in 2001.
by demonstrating that specialization occurs within rather than across products. Fur-
ther evidence of such specialization, identiﬁed via prices across country varieties within
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China’s growing export overlap with the OECD is faster than that of
any other individual U.S. trading partner. Table 11 reports countries with
the top ten OECD manufacturing ESI at ten-year intervals over the sample
period. China’s rank jumps from 21 in 1972 (not shown) to 3 in 2001, just
behind Mexico (the perennial leader) and Korea and ahead of Taiwan.
Regression analysis reveals that China’s manufacturing export similar-
ity with the OECD is substantially higher than that of countries with sim-
ilar relative endowments, and that this premium is increasing with time.
Table 13 reports coeﬃcients from an OLS regression of trading partners’
ESI with the OECD on country relative endowments and a China dummy
variable,
ESItc = αt + βXtc + γCHINAtc + εtpc, (3)
where Xtc is a country characteristic, CHINAtc is a dummy variable equal-
ing unity if the product is from China, and αt is a year ﬁxed eﬀect. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are reported be-
low coeﬃcients, virtually all of which are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. Two country characteristics are examined. The ﬁrst, World
Bank PPP-adjusted per capita GDP, is a proxy for capital abundance. I
use PCGDP rather than an explicit measure of capital abundance because
the latter are unavailable for a large set of countries or for the full 1972
to 2001 sample period.17 The second country characteristic is a measure
of skill abundance based on Barro and Lee (2000) educational attainment
data.18 Here, I measure skill abundance as the percent of the population
attaining either a secondary education or higher.
The results in Table 13 indicate that export similarity with the OECD
is positively and signiﬁcantly related to countries’ per capita GDP and
skill abundance, an outcome that is consistent with the factor proportions
framework. The dummy variables for China indicate that China’s ESI
17Results using an explicit measure of capital per worker (e.g., from the Penn World
Tables), based on a shorter time period and smaller set of countries, provides similar
results.
18Barro and Lee (2000) data are available at ﬁve-year intervals rather than annually.
This feature of the data accounts for the large diﬀerence in the number of observations
across the columns of Table 14. To increase the sample size, I use the 1970 value for
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with the OECD is on average 0.39 and 0.27 higher than for countries with
similar PCGDP and skill abundance, respectively.
Table13 also contains results based on regressions which include an in-
teraction of the CHINA dummy with three decade dummies, i.e., one for
the 1970s (1972-1979), one for the 1980s (1980-1989) and one for the 1990s
(1990-2001).19 The sign and signiﬁcance pattern of these coeﬃcients indi-
cates that China’s “excess” similarity has increased over time. Coeﬃcients
on the dummy variables in the PCGDP regression, for example, indicate a
premium of 0.15, 0.36 and 0.57 for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, respectively.
4.2. Chinese Export Prices
This section exploits export prices to measure the relative sophistica-
tion of Chinese export varieties within products. The data indicate that
Chinese varieties commanded a premium relative to countries with similar
per capita GDP and skill abundance in the 1970s and 1980s, but that this
trend reverses in the 1990s. They also reveal that the price premium of
OECD varieties relative to Chinese varieties is widening with time in some
industries.
An extremely useful feature of the Feenstra et al. (2002) data is the
inclusion of both quantity and value information for a large number of goods
and countries, rendering possible the calculation of unit values. I compute
the unit value of product p from country c, upc, by dividing import value
(Vpc)b yi m p o r tq u a n t i t y( Qpc), upc = Vpc/Qpc.20 Examples of the units
employed to classify products include dozens of shirts in apparel, square
meters of carpet in textiles and pounds of folic acid in chemicals. Because
units vary by products within industries, industry-level unit values cannot
be computed.21
19As noted in the previous footnote, the by-decade results for skill abundance are based
on two observations per decade.
20For some years and products, there are multiple country observations of value and
quantity. In those cases, I deﬁne the unit value to be a value-weighted average of the
observations. Availability of unit values ranges from 77 percent of product-country
observations in 1972 to 84 percent of observations in 2001.
21It is important to note that the unit values in this dataset are not perfect. A study
by the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (1995) identiﬁed underlying product heterogeneity
and classiﬁcation error as two major sources of unit value error in an in-depth analysis of
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To identify the relative price of Chinese exports relative to similarly
developed countries, I use the same methodology presented in the previous
section to regress country-product unit values on country relative endow-
ments and a China dummy variable,
log(utpc)=αtp + βXtc + γCHINAtc + εtpc, (4)
where utpc is the unit value of product p from country c in year t, Xtc is a
country characteristic, CHINAtc is a dummy variable equaling unity if the
product is from China, and αtp is a year-product ﬁxed eﬀect. To insure an
appropriate range of countries in each product market, regressions are run
on all manufacturing products originating in at least two countries with
real PCGDP below 10% and above 90% of the U.S. level in each year,
respectively. As above, I use per capita GDP and skill abundance as
measures of trading partners’ relative endowments.
Regression coeﬃcients and robust standard errors, displayed in Table
14, demonstrate a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
countries’ export prices and their per capita GDP or skill abundance.
These coeﬃcients are similar to those reported in Schott (2004) and suggest
that capital- and skill-abundant countries use their endowment advantage
to produce goods that are vertically superior to goods emanating from labor
abundant countries.
Coeﬃcients on the CHINA dummy variable in the ﬁrst and third
columns of the table show that Chinese products on average sell for a dis-
count relative to their PCGDP and skill abundance. Here, as above, results
using by-decade China dummy variables in columns two and four reveal that
the relative price of Chinese varieties is declining with time: the China-
decade dummy ﬂips from positive to negative over time in the PCGDP
regression, while it becomes increasingly negative in the skill abundance
regression.22 The estimated 1990s discounts are 31.1 and 89.3 percent
controlling for PCGDP and skill abundance, respectively. These contrast
with premia of 30.4 and -42.7 percent in the 1970s, respectively.
Similar trends appear across manufacturing industries. Table 15 re-
ports the results of estimating equation 4 by one-digit SITC industry. Re-
i saf o c u so ft h i ss e c t i o n .
22As above, the by-decade results for skill abundance are based on the two years per
decade for which skill abundance data are available.The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 15
sults indicate that the trend reversal is strongest in Machinery and weaker
in Chemicals and Manufactured Materials.
A comparison of Chinese prices to those of the member countries of






where in the tables below UVRtpc is expressed in base two logs to preserve
symmetry around zero. Table 16 reports the mean OECD country - China
unit value ratio by manufacturing industry between 1991 and 2001. Two
features of the data are noteworthy. First, the table illustrates that OECD
exports sell for substantially more than Chinese exports in all industries
a c r o s st h ee n t i r ep e r i o d . T h e s ep r i c ep r e m i aa r eg r e a t e s ti nM a c h i n e r y
and lowest in Chemicals, which likely contain the highest and lowest shares
of vertical diﬀerentiation within products, respectively. OECD machinery
varieties, for example, command prices that are an average of 9.7 (i.e.,
23.28) times higher than Chinese machinery varieties. T-tests of these unit
value ratios (not reported) indicate that all of the ratios are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent level.
5. Conclusion
China’s export bundle increasingly overlaps with that of more developed
countries, rendering it more “sophisticated” than countries with similar rel-
ative endowments. On the other hand, its exports sell at a substantial
discount relative to its level of GDP and the exports emanating from the
OCED. Further research into the extent to which these trends are inﬂu-
enced by quality upgrading within China and the developing countries is
warranted.The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 16
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Asia 32 32 27 8 0.14 3,339
Carribean 18 44 31 7 0.08 6,212
Latin America 18 49 20 13 0.25 5,590
O E C D 5 3 44 02 1 0 . 3 8 6 7 , 6 8 8
C h i n a 2 14 23 6 30 . 1 0 2 , 2 7 4
Notes: Cells report mean (columns 2 through 5) or median (column 6) values across all
countries by region for which data is available. Education measures are for 1999 and are
from Barro and Lee (2000). Land abundance data are for 2000 and are from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators database. Capital per population data is for 1990 and
are from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993). Per capita capital values are adjusted for
purchasing power parity using World Bank PPP conversion factors; they are expressed in
1987 dollars. 
















Asia 58 84 68 32 52 27
Carribean 67 50 50 33 75 20
Latin America 68 26 89 5 19 21
O E C D 9 5 6 4 4 152 69
Notes: Cells report the percentile of each region's distribution that would occupied by China
if it were part of the region. See the notes to Table 1 for information on the source of each
relative endowment variable.  
Table 2: China’s Percentile in the Distribution of Asian, Latin American
and OECD Country Relative EndowmentsThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 19





Shanghai Municipality 3,725 8.7
Beijing Municipality 2,400 6.5










Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 782 9.8
Hainan 772 14.6
Jilin 767 6.8
Neimongu (Mongolia) Autonomous Region 647 16.4
Hunan 617 11.1
Henan 592 16.3





Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 541 23.3
Sichuan 538 24.3
Yunnan 538 16.8
Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous Region 515 66.2




Max / Min 12.4 16.5
Notes:  Source:  China Statistical Yearbook (2000); quoted 
from OECD (2001).  PCGDP figures are converted from CNY 
to USD using the official exchange rate of 8.27 $/CNY.  
Table 3: Inter-Regional Relative Endowment Disparities within ChinaThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 20
SITC1 Industry SITC2 Examples Product Examples
Number of Products 
(1972 / 2001)
0 Food Meat, Dairy, Fruit Live Sheep 703 / 1898
1 Beverage/Tobacco Wine, Cigarettes Carbonated softdrinks 75 / 167
2 Crude Materials





3 Mineral Fuels Coal, Coke, Petroleum Uleaded gasoline 49 / 98
4 Animal/Vegetable 
Oils
Lard, Soybean Oil Edible tallow 58 / 77
5 Chemicals
Organic Chemicals, Dyes, 
Medicines, Fertilizer, 
Plastics
Chloroform 757 / 2036
6 Manufactured 
Materials
Leather, Textile Yarn, 
Paper, Steel
Diaries and address 












Boy's shorts cotton 
playsuit parts, not knit
1869 / 3704




Sound recordings for 
State Department use
50 / 86
Table 4: Products by SITC1 IndustryThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 21
Country Region Country Region Country Region
Algeria (DZA) AF Fiji (FJI) AS Guyana (GUY) LA
Angola (AGO) AF Hong Kong (HKG) AS Honduras (HND) LA
Benin (BEN) AF India (IND) AS Mexico (MEX) LA
Burkina Faso (BFA) AF Indonesia (IDN) AS Nicaragua (NIC) LA
Burundi (BDI) AF Kiribati (KIR) AS Panama (PAN) LA
Cameroon (CMR) AF Korea (KOR) AS Paraguay (PRY) LA
Cen Aft Rep (CAF) AF Lao  (LAO) AS Peru (PER) LA
Chad (TCD) AF Macao (MAC) AS Suriname (SUR) LA
Congo (COG) AF Malaysia (MYS) AS Uruguay (URY) LA
Cote d'Ivoire (CIV) AF Mongolia (MNG) AS Venezuela (VEN) LA
Djibouti (DJI) AF Myanmar (MMR) AS Bahrain (BHR) ME
Egypt (EGY) AF Nepal (NPL) AS Cyprus (CYP) ME
Eq. Guinea (GNQ) AF New Caledonia (NCL) AS Iran (IRN) ME
Ethiopia (ETH) AF Pakistan (PAK) AS Israel (ISR) ME
Gabon (GAB) AF Papua New Guinea (PNG AS Jordan (JOR) ME
Gambia, The (GMB) AF Philippines (PHL) AS Kuwait (KWT) ME
Ghana (GHA) AF Singapore (SGP) AS Lebanon (LBN) ME
Guinea (GIN) AF Sri Lanka (LKA) AS Oman (OMN) ME
Guinea-Bissau (GNB) AF Taiwan (TWN) AS Qatar (QAT) ME
Kenya (KEN) AF Thailand (THA) AS Saudi Arabia (SAU) ME
Liberia (LBR) AF Viet Nam (VNM) AS Syrian  (SYR) ME
Madagascar (MDG) AF Bahamas (BHS) CAR UAE (ARE) ME
Malawi (MWI) AF Barbados (BRB) CAR Yemen (YEM) ME
Mali (MLI) AF Dom Rep (DOM) CAR Bermuda (BMU) NA
Mauritania (MRT) AF Guadeloupe (GLP) CAR Greenland (GRL) NA
Mauritius (MUS) AF Haiti (HTI) CAR Australia (AUS) OECD
Morocco (MAR) AF Jamaica (JAM) CAR Austria (AUT) OECD
Mozambique (MOZ) AF Neth Antilles (ANT) CAR Belgium (BEL) OECD
Niger (NER) AF St. Kitts and Nevis (KNA) CAR Canada (CAN) OECD
Nigeria (NGA) AF Trinidad  (TTO) CAR Denmark (DNK) OECD
Rwanda (RWA) AF Bulgaria (BGR) CEU Finland (FIN) OECD
Senegal (SEN) AF Czech Republic (CZE) CEU France (FRA) OECD
Seychelles (SYC) AF Hungary (HUN) CEU Germany (DEU) OECD
Sierra Leone (SLE) AF Poland (POL) CEU Greece (GRC) OECD
Somalia (SOM) AF Romania (ROM) CEU Iceland (ISL) OECD
South Africa (ZAF) AF Yugoslavia (YUG) CEU Ireland (IRL) OECD
Sudan (SDN) AF Albania (ALB) EU Italy (ITA) OECD
Tanzania (TZA) AF Gibraltar (GIB) EU Japan (JPN) OECD
Togo (TGO) AF Malta (MLT) EU Netherlands (NLD) OECD
Tunisia (TUN) AF Argentina (ARG) LA New Zealand (NZL) OECD
Uganda (UGA) AF Belize (BLZ) LA Norway (NOR) OECD
Zaire (ZAR) AF Bolivia (BOL) LA Portugal (PRT) OECD
Zambia (ZMB) AF Brazil (BRA) LA Spain (ESP) OECD
Zimbabwe (ZWE) AF Chile (CHL) LA Sweden (SWE) OECD
Afghanistan (AFG) AS Colombia (COL) LA Switzerland (CHE) OECD
American Samoa (ASM AS Costa Rica (CRI) LA Turkey (TUR) OECD
Bangladesh (BGD) AS Ecuador (ECU) LA UK (GBR) OECD
Cambodia (KHM) AS El Salvador (SLV) LA
China (CHN) AS Guatemala (GTM) LA
Notes: Countries sorted alphabetically by region. Region affiliations are mutually exclusive:
AF=Africa; AS=Asia; CAR=Carribean; CEU=Central Europe; LA=Latin America; ME=Middle
East; NA=North America. OECD definition excludes post-1973 entrants (e.g. Mexico and
Korea).
Table 5: U.S. Trading Partners by RegionThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 22
SITC1 Industry 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001
5 Chemicals 0 3 2 5 6 5 85 80
6 Manufactured Materials 0 9 10 14 5 12 79 54
7  M a c h i n e r y 0 7 5 1 9 2 1 79 35 6
8 Misc Manufacturing 0 26 29 22 4 15 63 31
Overall Manufacturing 0 11 11 18 3 15 83 52
Notes: Cells display the market share of each region's or country's exports to the U.S. Asia
results exclude China.
OECD China Asia Latin America
Table 6: U.S. Import Value Market Share by Region and Year
Country 1972 2001 Change Country 1972 2001 %Change
China 0.04 10.99 10.95 China 0.04 10.99 274
Mexico 1.96 12.08 10.12 Honduras 0.01 0.29 53
Malaysia 0.42 2.35 1.93 Sri Lanka 0.01 0.22 39
Korea 1.79 3.70 1.92 Guatemala 0.01 0.20 36
Ireland 0.25 1.94 1.69 Indonesia 0.04 0.92 21
Thailand 0.19 1.34 1.15 Hungary 0.02 0.32 19
Singapore 0.58 1.51 0.93 El Salvador 0.01 0.19 17
Philippines 0.27 1.16 0.89 Dom Rep 0.03 0.40 11
Indonesia 0.04 0.92 0.88 Costa Rica 0.02 0.21 10
Israel 0.53 1.25 0.72 Bulgaria 0.00 0.03 9
Brazil 0.50 1.16 0.65 Ireland 0.25 1.94 7
Notes: Table lists U.S. trading partners with the top ten absolute and percentage
changes in market share between 1972 and 2001.  
Absolute Change Percent Growth
Table 7: U.S. Trading Partners with the Largest Gains in Market Share
(Absolute and Percent Growth), 1972 to 2001
SITC1 Industry 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001 1972 2001
5 Chemicals 4 62 16 63 22 49 98 98
6 Manufactured Materials 7 63 45 79 34 68 96 98
7 Machinery 1 72 56 85 51 73 100 99
8  M i s c  M a n u f a c t u r i n g 1 68 17 28 74 57 09 89 6
O v e r a l l  M a n u f a c t u r i n g 9 7 05 18 03 86 79 79 8
China Asia Latin America OECD
Notes: Cells display share of products in the industry that are exported to the U.S. by at
least one country from the region.  Asia results exclude China.
Table 8: Product Penetration by Region and YearThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 23
Country 1972 2001 Difference
China 9 70 61
Korea 19 51 32
Mexico 26 56 29
Thailand 6 32 26
India 19 43 25
Taiwan 30 54 24
Indonesia 2 25 23
Canada 52 73 21
Malaysia 3 23 19
Italy 51 69 18
Brazil 14 31 17
Notes: Table lists U.S. trading partners with
the top ten absolute changes in product
penetration between 1972 and 2001.  
Table 9: U.S. Trading Partners with the Largest Gains in Manufacturing
Product Penetration, 1972 to 2001
Region 1972 1981 1991 2001
Asia 0.40 0.70 0.91 0.97
Latin America 0.16 0.48 0.70 0.86
OECD 0.09 0.28 0.55 0.75
Export Similarity with China
Notes:  Table displays each region's export similarity 
index (see text) with China.  Asia excludes China.
Table 10: Regions’ Export Similarity with ChinaThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 24
Mexico 0.53 Brazil 0.54 Mexico 0.72 Mexico 0.80
Brazil 0.41 Korea 0.49 Korea 0.66 Korea 0.78
Taiwan 0.40 Taiwan 0.48 Taiwan 0.63 China 0.75
Hong Kong 0.35 Mexico 0.48 China 0.55 Taiwan 0.64
Korea 0.35 Israel 0.46 Hong Kong 0.50 Brazil 0.60
South Africa 0.30 Hong Kong 0.39 Brazil 0.50 India 0.54
Israel 0.25 Singapore 0.33 Singapore 0.41 Israel 0.51
Colombia 0.24 Philippines 0.31 Israel 0.40 Hong Kong 0.46
Argentina 0.23 South Africa 0.30 Thailand 0.36 Thailand 0.45
India 0.22 China 0.28 India 0.35 Singapore 0.44
Notes: Table lists non-OECD countries with the highest export similarity index (ESI) with the
OECD at ten-year intervals from 1972 to 2001. Second column of each panel notes the
countries ESI. ESI ranges from zero (no overlap) to unity (total ovelap). The total number of
non-OECD U.S. trading partners in the sample increases from 131 in 1972 to 152 in 2001.
Top 10 Manufacturing Export Similarity Indexes with the OECD
1972 1981 1991 2001
Table 11: Countries with the Highest Export Similarity to the OECD
Export Similarity with OECD
Region 1972 1981 1991 2001
Asia 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.27
C h i n a 0 . 0 90 . 2 80 . 5 50 . 7 5
Latin America 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.34
Notes: Table displays each region's export similarity
index (see text) with the aggregate OECD. Asia
excludes China.
Table 12: Regional Export Similarity with the OECDThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 25
ESIct ESIct ESIct ESIct
Log (Real PCGDPct) 0.050 0.050
0.011 0.011
Log (Skill Abundancect) 0.069 0.070
0.014 0.014
China Dummy 0.387 0.273
0.010 0.023
China 70s 0.149 -0.020
0.016 0.023
China 80s 0.355 0.130
0.011 0.022
China 90s 0.569 0.466
0.010 0.025
Constant -0.287 -0.280 -0.056 -0.060
0.066 0.066 0.035 0.035
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,006 3,006 533 533
Unique Countries 110 110 79 79
R
2 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25
Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of country-year
manufacturing export similarity index with the OECD on country real
per capita GDP and skill abundance from 1972 to 2001. Explanatory
variables include an aggregate China dummy as well as this dummy
interacted with dummies for the 1970s (i.e.,1972-1979), 1980s
(i.e.,1980-1989)) and 1990s (i.e.,1990-2001). Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the country level reported below each
coefficient. All coefficients except the China70 dummy in column 4
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The p-value for the
insignificant dummy is 0.39.  
Table 13: China’s Relative Export Similarity Index with the OECDThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 26
Log(uvpct)L o g ( u v pct) Log(uvpct)L o g ( u v pct)
Log (Real PCGDPct) 0.254 0.256
0.029 0.029
Log (Skill Abundancect) 0.481 0.483
0.078 0.079
China Dummy -0.166 -0.780
0.079 0.068
China 70s 0.304 -0.427
0.087 0.073
China 80s 0.168 -0.383
0.083 0.058
China 90s -0.311 -0.893
0.078 0.072
Constant 0.911 0.924 1.410 1.405
0.129 0.240 0.256 0.257
Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,037,991 2,037,991 411,710 411,710
Unique Products 20,660 20,660 14,052 14,052
Unique Countries 155 155 101 101
Adj R
2 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71
Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of country-product unit
values on country real per capita GDP and skill abundance from 1972 to
2001. Sample restricted to products originating in at least two countries
with real PCGDP below 10% and above 90% of the U.S. level in that year,
respectively. Explanatory variables include an aggregate China dummy
as well as this dummy interacted with dummies for the 1970s (i.e.,1972-
1979), 1980s (i.e.,1980-1989)) and 1990s (i.e.,1990-2001). Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level reported below
each coefficient. All coefficients (except constant) are statistically
significant at the 5% level.  
Table 14: China’s Relative Export Prices 1972-2001The Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 27
5 Chemicals 6 Manuf Mat 7 Machinery 8 Misc Manuf
Log(uvpct)L o g ( u v pct) Log(uvpct)L o g ( u v pct)
Log (Real PCGDPct) 0.17 0.22 0.28 0.28
0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03
China 70s 0.12 0.37 0.27 0.22
0.15 0.08 0.24 0.07
China 80s 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.17
0.14 0.08 0.22 0.06
China 90s -0.21 -0.20 -0.88 -0.17
0.12 0.07 0.19 0.06
Constant 0.61 -0.05 1.94 1.24
0.37 0.21 0.56 0.22
Product-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172,350 582,799 387,808 895,034
Unique Countries 2,700 6,294 3,866 7,820
Uniique Products 153 155 155 155
Adj R
2 0.54 0.62 0.70 0.68
Notes: Table reports OLS regression results of country-product unit values on
country real per capita GDP and skill abundance from 1972 to 2001. Sample
restricted to products originating in at least two countries with real PCGDP below
10% and above 90% of the U.S. level in that year, respectively. Explanatory
variables include an aggregate China dummy interacted with dummies for the 1970s
(i.e.,1972-1979), 1980s (i.e.,1980-1989)) and 1990s (i.e.,1990-2001). Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level reported below each
coefficient.  
Table 15: China’s Relative Export Prices 1972-2001, by Industry
Industry 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
5 Chemicals 1.01 1.13 1.19 1.18 1.10 1.14 1.15 1.28 1.28 1.29 1.37
6 Manuf Mat 1.75 1.86 1.75 1.67 1.75 1.66 1.70 1.66 1.66 1.56 1.57
7 Machinery 3.20 3.30 3.36 3.43 3.24 3.36 3.27 3.20 3.20 3.22 3.28
8 Misc Manuf 2.14 2.13 2.11 2.11 2.16 2.13 2.09 2.11 2.03 1.96 2.01
Notes: Table displays mean log base 2 unit value ratios for OECD countries versus China across
noted one-digit SITC manufacturing industries from 1991 and 2001. All ratios are statistically
different from zero in a one-sided t-test at the 1% level. Observations for each industry range
from 3,789 to 23,910.
Table 16: Mean OECD/China Manufacturing Unit Value RatiosThe Relative Sophistication of Chinese Exports 28





























Figure 1: Inter- and Intra-National Specialization in a Multiple Cone Equi-

































1972 1981 1991 2001
Figure 2: Distribution of U.S. Trading Partners’ ESI with the OECD, 1972
to 2001